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The Impact of the Asia Crisis 
on U.S. Industry: 
An Almost-Free Lunch?
hen the Asia crisis erupted in the summer of 1997, 
many forecasters predicted that one effect would be an 
end to the economic boom in the United States. Surely, it was 
argued, the drop in demand for U.S. exports combined with 
surging import volumes would finally be enough to slow the 
U.S. economy. It did not happen. Indeed, the Asia crisis’ overall 
effects on the United States were small.1 In terms of trade flows, 
total manufactured imports from the Asian countries affected 
by a currency collapse—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, which I will refer to as the “Crisis 4” countries—grew 
only slightly, while exports to these countries fell sharply 
(Chart 1).2 
Although the overall effects of the Asia crisis on the United 
States were modest, they could have obscured other, larger 
effects in particularly vulnerable U.S. industries. Accordingly, 
this article looks beyond the aggregate data associated with the 
crisis and instead focuses on these potentially larger effects at 
the sector level. It arrives at four key findings. First, dollar 
prices of imports from the Crisis 4 countries fell substantially 
after the currency collapses of summer 1997. In a few cases, the 
drops were accompanied by a fall in U.S. relative output prices. 
Second, most U.S. industries experienced a decline in exports 
to Asia, but in no case was the decline in export demand big 
enough to have a noticeable impact on the trend in U.S. 
shipments. Third, in only a few cases was there a sharp rise in 
import volumes resulting from the crisis. And finally, in only 
one case—the steel industry—was there clear evidence of a 
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• The large devaluations experienced by Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia beginning 
in the summer of 1997 raised concerns that 
imports from these countries would soar while 
demand for U.S. exports weakened, causing 
U.S. industries to suffer.
• As it turned out, manufactured imports from 
the four countries rose only slightly, and the 
decline in U.S. exports was not large enough 
to have a significant effect on trend output 
for most industries.
• The one exception to this pattern was the 
steel industry: there, sharply rising imports 
and falling exports led to a drop in output 
and prices.
• Overall, the United States enjoyed an 
“almost-free lunch” in the wake of the Asia 
crisis. Cheaper imports benefited consumers, 
and domestic production and employment 
were largely unhurt.  
James Harrigan
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Chart 1
Total U.S. Manufacturing Trade with the
Crisis 4 Countries
Source: United States International Trade Commission.
Notes: The Crisis 4 countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand. The dashed line indicates the start of the Asia crisis.
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pattern of rising imports, falling exports, and an associated 
drop in domestic prices and employment.
These findings suggest, for the most part, that imports from 
Asia do not compete directly with U.S. production. Therefore, 
an appreciation in the dollar with respect to Asian currencies 
leads to gains in consumption with little or no domestic pain. 
(For example, consumer videocassette recorders are not 
produced in the United States, so a fall in their price benefits 
consumers without pressuring U.S. producers.) This 
consumption feast amounts to an almost-free lunch.
Analytical Framework
The basic supply-and-demand framework is adequate for 
presenting a discussion of the sectoral impact of the Asia crisis. 
In such a framework, the analysis looks at prices and quantities 
for one industry or firm at a time, holding all other prices 
(including wage costs and the prices of competing goods) 
constant. From the point of view of U.S. industry, the crisis 
represents a drop in demand for two reasons. First, demand by 
Asians for U.S. imports decreases due to the recessions in Asia 
and the higher Asian currency prices of U.S. imports after the 
devaluations of the Asian currencies. Second, demand by 
Americans for U.S.-produced goods falls because the dollar 
price of Asian goods, which are substitutes for U.S.-produced 
goods, also falls. This means that if we hold other factors that 
affect demand and cost constant, we should expect to see a 
drop in U.S. shipments and in U.S. prices (Exhibit 1). The fall 
in domestic output and prices is a measure of the crisis’ impact 
on U.S. industry.
However, there are problems with applying this framework 
to the events of the last three years. The most obvious one is 
that, for whatever reason, domestic aggregate demand in the 
United States has continued to grow briskly in the wake of the 
Asia crisis. (Indeed, as van Wincoop and Yi [2000] observe, the 
growth in domestic demand may in part be an endogenous 
response to the crisis.) The growth in domestic aggregate 
demand may have offset, or even reversed, the decline in 
industry demand caused by the crisis. It is important to keep 
this caveat in mind as we look at the data.
Although I do not focus on the effects of the crisis on Asian 
exporters, it is helpful to clarify the empirical results to con-
sider the effects of a currency devaluation on them.3 From the 
exporters’ perspective, a devaluation increases their domestic 
currency price for any given dollar price received in the world 
market. From the standpoint of the U.S. market for Asian 
goods, this change amounts to an outward shift in the supply of 
Asian goods (Exhibit 2). Generally, this change will prompt 
exporters to raise the profit margin on their exports, which 
would lower their dollar price less than proportionately with 
the devaluation.4 Thus, we would expect to see falling import 
prices and rising import volumes in the United States. 
The fall in dollar prices should also lead to a rise in import 
values, since the elasticity of demand with respect to price in FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 73
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imperfectly competitive markets is greater than one: Exhibit 2 
shows that a 1 percent drop in price will lead to a more than 
1 percent increase in imports, and hence an increase in the 
dollar value of imports (price  quantity).5 Although a 
devaluation certainly will increase domestic currency revenues 
for Asian exporters, it may also directly increase their costs if 
the exporters import many of their inputs. This cost-increasing 
effect of a devaluation comes about because the local price of 
imported inputs will increase with the devaluation. Even in 
such a case—which might be relevant for sectors in which 
Asian export industries are based on the assembly of imported 
parts—the rise in cost will not outweigh the effects of the rise 
in demand, and Asian exporters will increase their shipments 
to the United States. Consequently, the dollar value of exports 
to the United States will rise.
The above analysis assumes that the elasticity of demand 
facing exporters is greater than one, which will be the case for 
individual firms. However, what is true for an individual firm 
need not be true for the market as a whole. If all exporting firms 
were to expand their output at the same time, total market 
demand might increase only slightly. In such a situation, firms 
would find themselves lowering prices at the same time as their 
competitors, so that each individual firm’s gain in sales in the 
export market would be lower than it would be if it was the only 
firm cutting prices. If total market demand is inelastic, then the 
dollar value of exports will fall, as prices decrease proportion-
ately more than the quantities sold increase.
In summary, this brief theoretical discussion suggests that 
U.S. import volumes from Asia should rise as dollar import 
prices fall, with the dollar value of imports either rising (the 
most likely case) or falling (if total import demand is inelastic). 
It also suggests that U.S. production, U.S. output prices, and 
U.S. exports to Asia should fall.
Data Construction and Definitions
The Asia crisis began in the summer of 1997 with the 
devaluation of the Thai baht, followed closely by currency 
collapses in Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Although the 
timing across countries varied, for consistency of analysis I use 
August 1997 as the first month of the crisis. To evaluate the 
impact of the crisis on U.S. industries, I look at monthly data 
on manufacturing production and trade at the finest possible 
level of detail. An important limitation, however, is the absence 
of reliable U.S. data on the prices of imports and exports, 
particularly at the industry level. 
For U.S. production, data on output and prices are available 
for the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification industries. 
I deflate production by the appropriate industry-level producer 
price index (PPI). Data on the value of imports and exports are 
available at a somewhat finer degree of detail.
A partial solution to the lack of reliable U.S. import and 
export price data is to look at export prices in the Crisis 4 
countries. Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand have some sectoral 
data (Korea’s are the most detailed), although no data at all are 
available for Indonesia. These prices are reported in the 
domestic currencies and are converted to dollars using the 
nominal exchange rate.
To construct real import and export data, I deflate nominal 
exports by the domestic PPI, which is a good approximation if 
exports do not differ much from goods sold domestically. 
I deflate imports from Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand by 
the most appropriate sectoral export price index from each 
The Asia crisis began in the summer 
of 1997 with the devaluation of 
the Thai baht, followed closely by 
currency collapses in Korea, Malaysia, 
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Chart 2
Korean Export Prices and the Nominal Exchange Rate
Selected Industries
Source: Data Resource International, Asia.
Notes: Standard Industrial Classification codes: apparel, 23; electronics, 36; primary metals, 33; transport equipment, 37. The dashed lines indicate 







































country; for imports from Indonesia, I use an import-weighted 
average of prices from the other three countries.
All data series are seasonally adjusted. To smooth some of 
the noise left over even after removing seasonal factors, I use 
data that are a two-month moving average. That is, for each 
month, the value of the series in question is equal to an average 
of the current month’s and the previous month’s value.
Prices
As expected, the fragmentary data that are available confirm 
that Crisis 4 export prices from Asia generally fell quickly after 
the currency devaluations. Chart 2 presents dollar export prices 
for selected Korean export industries plotted against the won 
exchange rate. In every sector, dollar prices fell when the won 
collapsed. What is striking about the Korean data is the 
evidence that prices in many sectors had been falling even 
before the won collapsed. For example, prices of apparel and 
transport equipment began to drop shortly after the won 
started to depreciate in the summer of 1996. Malaysian dollar 
export prices also fell rapidly when that country’s currency 
collapsed (Chart 3). The evidence for Thailand is mixed: a 
small response of export prices to the baht devaluation 
occurred in the manufacturing (other than machinery) sector, 
and there was no response at all for machinery (Chart 4).
The decline in the prices of goods 
imported from Asia . . . did not have 
much impact on output prices in 
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Chart 4
Thai Export Prices and the Nominal Exchange Rate
Selected Industries
Source: Data Resource International, Asia.
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1995 average = 100
Chart 3
Malaysian Export Prices and the Nominal Exchange Rate
Selected Industries
Source: Data Resource International, Asia.
Notes: Standard Industrial Classification codes: textiles and apparel, 22, 23; primary metals, 33; various manufacturing, 29, 32, 38, 39; fabricated metals
and machinery, 34-37. The dashed lines indicate the start of the Asia crisis.
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Fabricated Metals and Machinery
Malaysian export
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1995 year average = 100
Chart 5




Source: United States Department of Commerce.
Notes: Standard Industrial Classification codes: apparel, 23; electronics, 36; primary metals, 33; transport equipment, 37. The dashed lines 
indicate the start of the Asia crisis.
The decline in the prices of goods imported from Asia, 
however, did not have much impact on output prices in the 
United States. Chart 5 shows the relative price of sectoral 
output for selected industries, where each industry’s price is 
expressed relative to the consumer price index for the entire 
U.S. economy.6 As illustrated by the downward trends in the 
chart, manufacturing prices have been falling relative to 
nonmanufacturing prices for many years.7 The onset of the 
Asia crisis might have been expected to accelerate this trend, as 
falling prices for imports put pressure on U.S. manufacturers. 
In fact, this did not occur in most sectors. For example, the 
path of prices in the transport equipment sector was 
unchanged after August 1997. Even the electronics sector 
simply saw a continuation of the long-term (and steep) decline 
in relative prices. 
The one major exception was the primary metals sector, 
where the collapse in steel prices clearly coincided with the 
onset of the crisis and can plausibly be linked to import 
competition, as I will show. Two other sectors, not shown here, 
that saw price declines are food and paper. The share of imports 
from Asia in U.S. domestic consumption of these products was 
near zero, however, so it is clear that imports were not respon-
sible for the price declines.8 Nevertheless, the Asia crisis may 
have affected these prices less directly: the recession in Asia was 
accompanied by a drop in world commodity prices, which 
likely helps to explain the drop in domestic food and paper 
prices.
Imports and Exports
In most cases, prices of imports into the United States fell after 
August 1997 without corresponding drops in U.S. domestic 
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Chart 6
U.S. Trade with the Crisis 4 Countries as a Share of Domestic Output
Selected Industries       
Apparel Primary Metals
Electronics Transport  Equipment
Imports from Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Imports from Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Imports from Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Sources: United States International Trade Commission; United States Department of Commerce.
Notes: The Crisis 4 countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The chart depicts total imports from and exports to the Crisis 4, 
divided by domestic shipments. Standard Industrial Classification codes: apparel, 23; electronics, 36; primary metals, 33; 
transport equipment, 37. The dashed lines indicate the start of the Asia crisis.
Imports from Crisis 4
Share
share of imports in domestic consumption. At the same time, 
the devaluations and recessions in the Crisis 4 countries should 
trigger a drop in U.S. exports to those countries. Chart 6 shows 
imports and exports divided by domestic shipments for 
selected industries. (I scale by domestic shipments to give a 
sense of how important import competition is for each sector.) 
In three sectors—paper (not shown), primary metals (a sector 
that includes the steel industry), and nonelectrical machinery 
(not shown)—the pattern of rising imports and falling exports 
is very clear. The surge in imports is most dramatic in primary 
metals, but this surge underestimates the pressure that the 
sector was experiencing in the wake of the crisis since it does 
not include imports from the rest of the world, which were also 
rising at this time. The sharp drop in primary metals imports in 
late 1998 came in the wake of antidumping duties, which were 
imposed during the summer of 1998, along with strong 
political pressure from U.S. trade negotiators.
In the apparel sector, exports were near zero, so they could 
not fall much, but imports rose. A common pattern of sharply 
falling exports but no deviation from trend imports is evident 
in a number of sectors not shown here, including textiles, 
chemicals, fabricated metals, and precision instruments.
The most surprising pattern occurs in the electronics sector, 
where import values actually fell in the wake of the crisis. Two-
thirds of the decline is accounted for by a fall in the value of 
semiconductor imports, with the remainder attributed to a 
drop in household audio-video equipment. Certainly in the 
case of semiconductors, and most likely in the case of audio-
video equipment, these drops in import value reflect steep 
drops in prices: even though real imports most likely rose, 
the value of imports fell because prices fell more quickly than 
the quantities imported increased.
As the example of electronics trade illustrates, the absence of 
























Domestic Shipments and Exports to and Imports from the Crisis 4 Countries
Selected Industries
Log Real Shipments Log Real Shipments
Log Real Exports and Imports Log Real Exports and Imports
Exports to Crisis 4
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Log Real Exports and Imports
Imports from Crisis 4
Imports from Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Imports from Crisis 4
Exports to Crisis 4
Imports from Crisis 4
Sources: United States International Trade Commission; United States Department of Commerce; Data Resource International, Asia.
Notes: The Crisis 4 countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Standard Industrial Classification codes: apparel, 23; electronics, 36; 
primary metals, 33; transport equipment, 37. The dashed lines indicate the start of the Asia crisis. Variables are scaled by 100 times the average 
value of the log real shipments in 1995.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 79
interpret changes in import values. The fairly modest growth in 
import values may be obscuring large increases in real imports 
accompanied by falling prices. What is clear, though, is that the 
bulk of the trade response to the Asia crisis is accounted for by 
falling exports, rather than rising imports.
Domestic Production
I now present a brief examination of the changes in domestic 
shipments. Chart 7 depicts real domestic shipments from 1995 
through early 1999, along with real exports and real imports. 
These real trade data should be viewed skeptically because true 
price deflators are not available, as noted earlier.
In several sectors, there was a slowdown in shipments in 
1998, and in some cases the timing of the slowdown coincided 
with changes in the Crisis 4 countries’ imports and exports. 
Examples of this pattern in sectors not shown in Chart 7 are 
textiles, paper, and chemicals: in each industry, production 
slowed soon after exports to the Crisis 4 fell. The clearest 
example, however, is primary metals, where a drop in exports 
to the Crisis 4, a substantial import surge, and a falling of 
domestic prices and shipments all coincided in the first half 
of 1998.
In many other sectors, however, there was no discernible 
impact of the Asia crisis on shipments. Output growth in 
transport equipment showed continued strength through 1998 
and into 1999. Among industries not shown in Chart 7, 
fabricated metals, nonelectrical machinery, electronics, and 
instruments all exhibited a similar pattern.9 This pattern 
occurred despite the fact that Crisis 4 exports fell sharply in 
most of these sectors and real imports from the Crisis 4 
countries held steady or grew. 
Conclusion
The impact of the Asia crisis on U.S. industries was small and 
localized. Only one sector, the steel industry, experienced 
falling prices and output in the wake of the crisis, and political 
action mitigated this impact within a few months. Although the 
Crisis 4 countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand 
cut back on their purchases of U.S.-manufactured goods across 
the board starting in late summer 1997, the drop in foreign 
demand was offset by strong domestic demand as well as 
demand by noncrisis foreign countries in almost every sector.
Import volumes from the Crisis 4 expanded only modestly 
after the onset of the crisis, an outcome that is likely due in part 
to relatively inelastic U.S. demand for Crisis 4 exports. The 
increased supply drove prices down almost as much as it 
increased sales in most instances; in the case of semi-
conductors, prices fell so fast that the value of exports 
actually fell.
Two key points can be derived from this analysis. First, 
imports from developing Asia do not seem to compete directly 
with most U.S. manufacturing sectors. This phenomenon is 
evident from the modest impact that the currency devaluations 
of 1997 had on U.S. output prices and shipments, even as U.S. 
consumers benefited from less expensive imports. In this sense, 
the crisis was good news: consumers got lower prices and 
producers did not suffer. The only exception was the steel 
industry, which was directly hit by the crisis. Second, U.S. 
export markets in developing Asia are still so small that even a 
collapse in demand there does not have a large effect on total 
demand for U.S.-manufactured goods. Endnotes
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1. These effects are discussed extensively in van Wincoop and Yi 
(2000). The small impact should not have come as a complete 
surprise. In 1996, exports to the four Asian countries affected by the 
crisis accounted for only 0.6 percent of U.S. GNP, while imports from 
these countries represented 0.8 percent of GDP. Even if exports had 
fallen by half and imports had doubled, the effect on U.S. GDP would 
have been a slowing of growth by only 1 percentage point.
2. As a share of total U.S. imports, the imports from the Crisis 4 hardly 
grew at all, while the share of total U.S. exports to the Crisis 4 declined 
from almost 8 percent when the crisis hit to slightly more than 
4 percent by mid-1998.
3. Throughout this article, “devaluation” refers to a devaluation of 
Asian currencies with respect to the dollar: an increase in the Asian 
currency price of one U.S. dollar or, equivalently, a fall in the dollar 
price of an Asian currency.
4. For the simple analytics of exchange rate pass-through, see Marston 
(1990). This result holds if marginal costs are constant.
5. Throughout this article, “elasticity” refers to the magnitude of the 
change in demand for a good with respect to a change in the price of 
the good. 
6. The relative price compares the output price of a sector with the 
overall price level. This is the relevant comparison, since we want to 
know how each sector is doing compared with the economy as a 
whole. Conceptually, it would be better to express industry prices 
relative to the GDP deflator, but the GDP deflator is not available 
monthly. Changes in the CPI, which are available monthly, are 
extremely highly correlated with changes in the GDP deflator. 
7. Charts 5-7 focus on only four industries: apparel, electronics, 
primary metals, and transport equipment. These sectors are 
representative of the behavior of other sectors, as shown in 
a longer version of this study available from the author.
8. A similar pattern of falling prices and domestic output starting in 
late summer 1997 is visible in the oil sector, where the share of imports 
from East Asia is zero.
9. The drop in output of the transport equipment sector in mid-1998 
was due to a strike at General Motors.References
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